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1. Introduction 
No one would dispute that modern capitalist societies have exhibited a historically 
unprecedented level of technological dynamism. In contrast, assessments of the social 
consequences of this dynamism diverge widely. It is not possible here to provide a 
comprehensive overview of competing assessments. I shall first present three important 
theoretical perspectives on this issue in normative social theory: classical liberalism, liberal 
egalitarianism, and Marxism. I shall then develop a historical narrative of some of the most 
significant social consequences of technological change in recent decades. I conclude that a 
Marxian framework illuminates the role of technical change in shaping the present moment 
of social history better than the competing frameworks considered in this paper.  
2. Classical liberalism and the social consequences of technology 
“Liberalism” is one of the most ambiguous words in our language. It has become one of the 
strongest terms of opprobrium used by “conservative” advocates of free markets in the United 
States today against their enemies, despite the fact that they are themselves part of the 
tradition of classical liberalism beginning with John Locke and Adam Smith.1 For adherents of 
this tradition individuals are the basic unit of moral concern, and all individuals are asserted to 
be equally worthy of moral respect. From this moral equality principle it follows as a corollary 
that all individuals should be free to decide for themselves both their life plans and how best 
to carry them out. Private property rights are an essential component of a social order based 
on these ideas. Individuals are asserted to have a right to privately appropriate previously 
unowned things as well as the things they themselves make (either alone or with the aid of 
others who freely chose to cooperate with them). They also have the fundamental right to 
freely decide how to use their acquired property, including a right to undertake exchanges 
should they wish to do so. The exercise of these rights is, of course, subject to the constraint 
that the equal rights of others to do the same are acknowledged and respected.  
Classical liberal theorists affirm free markets on the grounds that they institutionalize rights 
to liberty and property better than any feasible alternative. This rights-based argument is 
                                                                 
1 “Classical liberalism,” “egalitarian liberalism,” and “Marxism” are ideal types. Particular theorists 
grouped under a particular heading can approach the ideal type in question more or less closely. A 
fairly pure form of the perspective on the social consequences of technological change in capitalism 
developed in the following paragraphs is found in Hayek, 1976. 
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usually conjoined with claims about the positive consequences of free market economies, 
with technological dynamism at the top of the list. In these societies producers have a strong 
incentive to introduce process innovations enabling goods and services to be produced more 
efficiently, since if they lower unit costs they can lower prices and win market share. There 
is an equally strong incentive to introduce product innovations that allow purchasers to 
fulfill existing wants and needs in more satisfactory ways, or to develop new wants and 
needs in ways they freely choose. 
The social consequences of this technological dynamism have profound normative significance 
within the classical liberal framework. Life plans require goods and services to be carried out. 
Free markets allow individuals themselves to choose the goods and services that they regard 
as most important to the fulfillment of their life plans. The drive to product innovations 
ensures that over time the goods and services that are produced necessarily tend to be those 
that contribute to freely chosen life plans to the greatest feasible extent. Further, the drive to 
process innovations ensures that over time that greatest feasible amount of those goods and 
services will be provided. If human flourishing can be defined as carrying out the lives we 
have chosen to live to the greatest feasible extent, then technological change in capitalist 
market societies provides the material preconditions for human flourishing. 
Technological change will only have these beneficial social consequences if market 
competition operates effectively. This in turn requires that economic agents are confident that 
their property rights will be respected, that they will be able to enter into voluntary contracts 
providing mutual benefits, and that the terms of these contracts will be adhered to. The main 
role of the state in the classical liberal framework is to provide a coercive apparatus ensuring 
that liberty and property rights can be enjoyed in security under “the rule of law.” 
For libertarians the legitimate functions of the state do not go beyond measures to protect 
individual citizens against force and fraud. Libertarianism, however, is only one species of 
classical liberalism. Relatively few advocates of classical liberalism argue against 
government funding of basic research or basic infrastructure. Many also hold that public 
resources should be mobilized for training programs to ensure that the workforce possesses 
needed technical skills. The belief is also widely shared that environmental problems can 
sometimes be serious enough to warrant regulation of polluting technologies. These sorts of 
state policies are said to complement free markets, enhancing their technological dynamism 
beyond what it would otherwise be and ensuring that this dynamism contributes to human 
flourishing to the greatest feasible extent.  
Despite support for such policies, however, there is still an important sense in which even 
non-libertarian classical liberals defend a “minimal state.” This can be seen by considering 
the technology policies that classical liberalism either excludes completely or accepts to a 
very limited degree. 
 Capital markets must be able to shift investment funds smoothly and rapidly to new 
innovative sectors, or to established sectors undertaking significant innovations. 
Burdensome state regulations of capital markets must be avoided if the positive social 
consequences of technological change are to be enjoyed to the fullest extent. 
 Labor markets must be flexible so that labor can shift from less innovative sectors and 
regions to more innovative sectors and regions as smoothly and rapidly as possible. 
Here too state regulations impeding flexibility must be avoided. 
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 Restrictions on trade should also be limited in order to enable consumers to enjoy the 
benefits of innovative imports, and to spur domestic firms to innovate in order to 
compete successfully in the world market. 
 Environmental regulations must not be considered prior to a complete and scientifically 
sound assessment of their costs and benefits. The former must not be understated, or 
the latter given undue weight, out of nostalgia for a romanticized and unrecoverable 
past. Further, the extent to which innovations can mitigate problems should not be 
underestimated; markets, for example, provide powerful incentives both to use costly 
natural resources more efficiently and to search for technological substitutes. In general, 
the best way to confront environmental and other difficulties is through market-driven 
innovation.  
These arguments can easily be generalized to justify free trade and free capital flows across 
borders. A regime of global governance eliminating restrictions on foreign trade and 
investment, encouraging flexible labor markets, and avoiding unsound environmental 
restrictions, follows as well. If anything, these conclusions have even greater normative 
force on the global level. Global justice demands that individuals throughout the world have 
access to the material preconditions for human flourishing. Technological dynamism has 
proven to be the single most effective means of generating these preconditions. Global 
justice, classical liberals conclude, therefore demands the adaptation of measures spurring 
technological dynamism, and the avoidance of public policies hampering it. 
3. Liberal egalitarianism and the social consequences of technology 
Like classical liberals, liberal egalitarians take individuals as the basic unit of moral concern 
and affirm that all individuals are equally worthy of moral respect. They question, however, 
whether free markets, minimal states, and a global regime based on free trade and free flows 
of capital adequately institutionalize the moral equality principle. John Rawls, perhaps the 
most influential political philosopher of the twentieth century, insisted that this principle 
demands a substantial (and not merely formal) equality of basic liberty rights, fair equality 
of opportunity, and a distribution of income and wealth in which all citizens benefit from 
economic growth (Rawls, 2001). Rawls and other liberal egalitarians hold that the 
institutional order defended by classical liberals necessarily tends to generate forms of 
concentrated economic power and severe inequality that are not consistent with these 
values. Liberal egalitarians conclude from this that the legitimate functions of the state 
exceed the more or less minimal set of functions acceptable to classical liberals. Public 
policies are required to limit concentrations of economic power and severe inequality. More 
specifically, the work of leading liberal egalitarians clearly implies a defense of technology 
policies beyond those proposed by classical liberals. 
For liberal egalitarians the moral equality principle implies a right to participate as an equal in 
social and political life. Technological change should not have the social consequence of 
eroding this right. The “creative destruction” of technological change in capitalism threatens to 
do precisely that. The life prospects of the workers and communities associated with 
established firms and sectors can be profoundly harmed by the rise of new firms and sectors 
operating at (or close to) a new scientific-technical frontier. In order to minimize the social 
harm resulting from technological advances liberal egalitarians call for public policies 
supporting the transfer of new technologies into threatened communities, the extensive 
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retraining of workers in those communities, and the provision of benefits sufficiently generous 
to ensure that affected individuals can continue to participate in social and political life as an 
equal during the transition period in which a new techno-economic paradigm is diffused. 
Liberal egalitarian theorists also regard the standard classical liberal response to 
environmental harms associated with the use of industrial technologies as inadequate. Markets 
encourage concern with environmental harms when they take the form of internal costs 
affecting a firm’s bottom line (if a rapidly depleting natural resource increases in price in a way 
that threatens profits, there is indeed an incentive to undertake a search for a technological 
substitute). A great number of environmental harms, however, are negative externalities, that 
is, harms that do not impact a polluting firm’s bottom line. In this case market competition 
does not merely fail to provide an incentive to search for innovations to eliminate or minimize 
the harm; in so far as this search involves additional costs there is a disincentive for 
undertaking it. Human flourishing requires a livable environment; that too forms part of the 
material precondition for being able to live lives of our own choosing. If, liberal egalitarians 
conclude, we are to ensure that the social consequences of technological change in capitalism 
are normative acceptable, we must institute far more comprehensive regulation of 
environmentally harmful technologies than those defended in the classical liberal tradition. 
A third point of contention arises from the consideration that in certain circumstances 
capitalist markets left to themselves will generate a rate of innovation significantly less than 
what is socially optimal from the standpoint of liberal egalitarianism (that is, less than what 
would provide the means of human flourishing to the greatest feasible extent). 
Technological change in a capitalist society ultimately depends upon allocations of financial 
capital. Classical liberals assume that the financial sector automatically functions as a means 
for efficiently allocating capital to the most technologically dynamic firms and sectors in the 
“real economy.” As heterodox economists have long understood, this is not necessarily the 
case. Unless the financial sector is subject to effective political regulation it will tend to treat 
its own profits as an end in itself, generating self-sustaining speculative bubbles in the 
process.2 In these circumstances increasing numbers of non-financial firms will be tempted 
to make profits from ownership of financial assets their ultimate end as well.3 Past a certain 
point this hampers, rather than aids, technological dynamism (Perez, 2002). Funds that 
could have gone to investments in innovative products or processes in the “real economy” 
are diverted to, or remain within, the financial sector. When the speculative bubbles burst, 
as they always do, the production of goods and services in the “real economy” to meet 
human wants and needs is further harmed. Liberal egalitarians conclude that the potentially 
                                                                 
2 An inflow of funds into the market for a particular category of financial asset will raise its price. The 
higher price can then attract a yet higher inflow of funds into that market, raising prices yet further. The 
increase in (paper) wealth serves as collateral for loans, which can then also be pumped back into that 
market, raising prices, increasing (paper) wealth, and providing greater collateral for further loans. 
Human ingenuity will invariably be able to generate myriad reasons why “this time it’s different,” and 
the inflation of capital assets is not “irrational exuberance.” Just as invariably, these reasons will be 
mistaken, and the bubble will inevitably burst. In the meantime, however, the profits that can be made 
from foolishly purchasing a capital asset at an overinflated price, and then selling it to a bigger fool, 
may greatly exceed that from alternative investments in the “real economy” (Soros, 2009). 
3 For example, retained earnings and borrowings will increasingly be devoted to stock buy-backs that 
raise the value of shares still outstanding (to the great benefit, we may add, of managers fortunate 
enough to hold stock options). 
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positive social consequences for human flourishing from technological change will be 
significantly restricted if the financial sector is not subject to effective political regulation.  
Another way in which unregulated markets can distort the process of technological innovation 
brings us back to the notion of creative destruction. Technological change disrupts existing 
equilibriums. Individual firms and entire industries are threatened with being eradicated by 
the emergence of new firms and sectors operating close to a new scientific-technical frontier. 
This gives established incumbents a strong incentive to oppose the rise of new technologies, at 
least until they have received a minimally satisfactory return on investments in older 
technologies. If these incumbents possess sufficiently concentrated economic power, the rate of 
innovation will be significantly less than the socially optimal rate. Effective technology policies 
by governments can counter-act this danger. Strong antitrust legislation can prevent the 
stifling of new technological developments by powerful incumbents. State procurements 
providing a guaranteed market for innovative products can have the same effect. The use of 
public funds for development projects extending into to the so-called “valley of death” can 
also determine a rate and path of technological change superior to that which would be 
selected by markets alone.4 And intellectual property rights regimes must leave ample space 
for newcomers, rather than act as barriers to entry protecting incumbents from innovators.  
The conflict between incumbents and innovators is a major theme of Yoachai Benkler’s The 
Wealth of Networks, perhaps the most important recent book examining the social 
consequences of technological change from a liberal egalitarian perspective. Benkler begins 
by noting that the technologies and forms of social organization of industrial capitalism 
limited the extent to which core liberal egalitarian values (autonomy, democracy, global 
justice) could be institutionalized. 
Autonomy is a relatively simple matter for classical liberals; one either lacks it (slaves, 
indentured servants, serfs) or one does not. For liberal egalitarians, in contrast, autonomy can 
be a matter of degrees. When effective use of the most advanced technologies for producing 
goods or services requires massive investments in fixed capital, the vast majority of the 
populace will lack access to the requisite financial resources. They will be able to participate in 
the process of producing goods and services – and thereby gain access to the monetary 
resources necessary to support themselves and their dependents—only if those who own fixed 
capital grant them permission to do so. For Benkler, this need to ask permission to engage in 
socially productive activity counts as a significant restriction of autonomy. Further, the owners 
and managers of firms have an overwhelming incentive to obtain a satisfactory return on 
investment in fixed capital before the technologies embedded in it become obsolete, leading 
managers to exert control as much control as they can over workers’ labor process. This too 
significantly restricts the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the workforce. 
In the liberal egalitarian view, the moral equality principle demands that each citizen should 
have the opportunity to participate as an equal in public life. Open public discourse is seen 
as the crucial component in the democratic will formation process at the heart of a democratic 
society (Habermas, 1998). In what Benkler terms the industrial information economy, 
however, public discourse was profoundly restricted. The use of advanced communication 
                                                                 
4 The “valley of death” is the metaphorical place where research projects falling between basic research 
and research foreseen to have immediately commercializable results would otherwise languish 
(Wessner, 2001). 
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technologies required massive investment in fixed capital, and here too the vast majority of 
the populace lacked access to the requisite funds. Concentrated private ownership of the 
technological means for circulating information distorts the process of democratic will 
formation in two ways. First, the private owners of the means of communication have a 
disproportionate ability to shape public opinion, both through the content they choose to 
transmit (or not transmit, as the case may be) and through the manner in which this content 
is presented. The second difficulty is perhaps even more important. In capitalism privately 
owned mass media requires a mass audience to attract advertising revenue. Suppose there 
are three different issues a newspaper could cover, or three different programs a television 
station could run, the first of great interest to a large minority, the second of great interest to 
a different large minority, and the third of mild interest to a vast majority. The third will 
tend to be selected for distribution through the mass media technologies of industrialized 
capitalism. This counts as a systematic restriction of public discourse (Benkler, 2006, 204-11). 
A third example of a tension between technological development and liberal egalitarian 
values concerns global justice. The areas of greatest market demand are not necessarily the 
areas of the greatest social need. Imagine two health aliments. One is a relatively minor 
condition that afflicts a number of affluent people in wealthy regions of the globe; the other 
a serious and potentially deadly affliction affecting far more people in poor regions, few of 
whom with significant disposable income. When pharmaceutical companies allocate 
investment to research proposals, priority will be given to research proposes aimed at 
developing drugs to address the former condition (Kremer, 2002). Similarly, research in 
agricultural technologies will be systematically biased in favor of innovations designed to 
improve the condition of affluent farmers, neglecting research on crops grown by producers 
in underdeveloped countries. Here too a strong case can be made that the social benefits per 
dollar invested would be much greater if research designed to aid those lacking purchasing 
power were given more priority. 
Benkler is well aware that anti-trust legislation, labor regulations, publicly owned mass 
media, government laboratories researching medical drugs and agricultural technologies, 
and other familiar public policies supported by liberal egalitarians, can lessen the extent to 
which the technologies of industrial capitalism are associated with these negative social 
consequences. But he also holds that these negative consequences could not have been 
avoided in the past without having to sacrifice many of the benefits of liberal capitalist 
societies—which, all in all, have still advanced the normative values of autonomy, 
democratic will formation, and the fulfillment of the important social priorities better than 
any alternative social formation in history. Today, however, technological developments are 
setting the stage for the new mode of production he terms “commons-based peer 
production.”5 These developments have the potential to generate a quite different set of 
social consequences than those associated with industrial technologies.  
                                                                 
5 The contemporary significance of commons-based peer production should not be underestimated: 
“Ideas like free Web-based e-mail, hosting services for personal Web pages, instant messenger software, 
social networking sites, and well-designed search engines emerged more from individuals or small 
groups of people wanting to solve their own problems or try something neat than from firms realizing 
there were profits to be gleaned” (Zittrain, 2008, 85). Encryption software, peer-to-peer file-sharing 
software, sound and image editors, and many other examples can be added to this list. “Indeed, it is 
difficult to find software not initiated by amateurs” (Zittrain, 2008, 89). Individuals cooperating outside 
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Unlike the technologies of the industrial age, important means of production today 
(computers and internet connections especially) are now widely affordable, thanks to the 
incredibly steep upward slope of the trajectory of information technologies.6 As a result, an 
ever-increasing number of individual agents are now able to own relatively advanced means 
of production themselves. Those who choose to develop the required expertise now have the 
power to decide for themselves what projects they wish to work on and with whom they wish 
to co-operate. By definition this expansion in the scope of free choice counts as an expansion of 
autonomy. Information technologies also enable a “many to many” model of communication 
to replace the “one to many” model of the mass media technologies of the industrial 
information age. This allows a tremendous expansion of the issues that can become subjects of 
public discourse. Democratic will-formation processes are furthered as the systematic 
limitations imposed by private ownership of the means of social communication are 
overcome. Finally, commons-based peer production greatly expands the ability of researchers 
with the time and expertise to collaborate effectively in developing drugs addressing the needs 
of those suffering from particular ailments, and seeds for farmers facing particular challenges, 
even if those helped by these technological products lack sufficient purchasing power to be of 
interest to pharmaceutical or agribusiness firms. This too clearly counts as a normative 
advance from the standpoint of the moral equality principle according to Benkler. 
Benkler is not a technological determinist; the fact that a new mode of production is 
technologically possible does not imply that it will automatically emerge and grow. 
Commons-based peer production threatens powerful incumbents, such as media 
conglomerates. Incumbents can be expected to use their immense resources to push 
technology policies in a direction serving their interests, stifling the development of this new 
mode of production, thereby preventing the social consequences of contemporary technologies 
from being as positive as they could be. Commons-based peer production, for example, both 
requires free knowledge goods as inputs and produces free knowledge goods as outputs. The 
more knowledge goods are treated by the legal system as free public goods, the more 
commons-based peer production can flourish. But the more the intellectual property rights 
regime is extended in response to the political pressure of incumbents, the more difficult it will 
be for this new mode of production to mature. Liberal egalitarians, Benkler concludes, cannot 
be indifferent to technology policy debates. A commitment to the moral equality principle 
requires a political commitment to struggle against the agenda of those wishing to extend 
intellectual property rights in order to maintain their rents (Woo, 2010).  
Liberal egalitarians are not romantics longing for a pre-modern world with little 
technological dynamism. They instead call for a social world in which the consequences of 
technological dynamism are consistent with the moral equality principle to the greatest 
feasible extent. In the absence of states and regimes of global governance implementing 
technology policies consistent with liberal egalitarian values, technological change in 
capitalism will necessarily tend to generate economic inequalities exceeding what is 
consistent with a substantive equality of civil and political liberties, a fair equality of 
                                                                                                                                                                   
capitalist firms have also collectively produced encyclopedias that have proven useful to millions, 
entirely new genres of music, unprecedented access to diverse sources of information and commentary 
about events across the globe, and so on. 
6 The shape of this trajectory is captured in “Moore’s Law,” according to which computing power per 
dollar invested doubles every eighteen months. 
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opportunity, and a wide diffusion of the benefits of technological advances. To a 
considerable extent, then, the debate between classical liberalism and liberal egalitarianism 
is a debate about the social consequences of technological change in capitalism. 
4. The Marxian analysis of technology and social change in capitalism 
For Marx too there is a sense in which the individual is the fundamental unit of moral 
concern. His notion of “the social individual” is different from the concept of the atomistic 
individual found in many writings in the classical liberal tradition. But it is not so different 
in principle from the conception held by liberal egalitarian theorists, who echo Marx’s call 
for “a society in which the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling 
principle,” and in which “the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all” (Marx, 1976, 739; Marx and Engels, 1976, 506). Further, Marx does not 
deny that the technological dynamism of capitalism has provided the material preconditions 
for human flourishing to an unprecedented extent. First-time readers are often surprised by 
the depth of Marx’s appreciation of capitalism’s technological dynamism: 
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive 
and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. 
Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry 
and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole 
continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the 
ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces 
slumbered in the lap of social labour? (Marx and Engels, 1976, 489). 
He also agrees with the liberal egalitarian claim that in the classical liberal model the social 
benefits of technological dynamism are profoundly restricted. For Marx, however, the 
problem goes deeper than the failure to provide effective political regulation of markets. 
From the Marxist point of view liberal egalitarianism, no less than classical liberalism, 
overlooks the fundamental inversion of ends and means at the very heart of capitalism. 
No one disputes that economic agents often make the acquisition of money their goal. But 
classical liberals and liberal egalitarians both consider money a merely proximate (short-to-
medium term) end. For members of both groups money is inherently a means to make 
exchange more efficient and convenient, thereby serving the ultimate end of providing men 
and women with the goods and services they require to meet their wants and needs. The 
disagreement between defenders of the two viewpoints centers on whether money 
automatically furthers this end in forms of capitalism with only a “minimal” state and 
regime of global governance, or whether the more extensive state and global regime 
defended by liberal egalitarians is required. However, Marx asserts, in a capitalist society 
“use-values must never be treated as the immediate aim … [The] aim is rather the unceasing 
movement of profit-making … [t]he ceaseless augmentation of value” (Marx, 1976, 254). In a 
society of generalized commodity production and exchange, most units of production 
necessarily must make the attainment of a M’ exceeding initial investment (M) their 
overarching goal. If they do not, over time they are increasingly likely to be pushed to the 
margins of social life (if not forced out of operation altogether) by units of production that 
do systematically make the appropriation of surplus value (the difference between M’ and 
M) their overarching end. Most individual agents simply seek the material resources 
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required to implement their life plans. In a society of generalized commodity exchange, 
however, obtaining those goods and services requires monetary resources, and this 
generally requires some sort of association (whether as an investor, a creditor, a wage 
worker, or a pensioner) with a unit of production that successfully aims at the “unceasing 
movement of profit-making … [t]he ceaseless augmentation of value.” Marx concludes from 
these considerations that the valorization principle is an organizing principle of social life on 
the level of society as a whole. Money is not a mere means adopted for the convenience of 
human agents; the accumulation of money capital is an end in itself.  
If this is correct, then the valorization principle must also be seen as the organizing principle 
of technological change. Technology cannot simply be seen as a means of furthering human 
flourishing; in a capitalist society technology is first and foremost a means to capital 
accumulation. Human ends are, of course, furthered by technological change. But they 
necessarily tend to be furthered if and only if doing so furthers (or is at least compatible 
with) the end of capital accumulation. 
Marx derived a set of structural tendencies regarding technological change from this 
starting point (Smith, 1997, 2010). The beginning of Volume 1 of Capital shows the need for 
producers to continually seek product innovations, lest their privately undertaken 
production turn out to have been socially wasted when competitors introduce products 
desired more by consumers. In Volume 2 Marx explains why advances in transportation and 
communication technologies necessarily tend to be sought in capitalism: they allow units of 
capital to complete circuits of investment, production, and sale at a faster rate, enabling 
more capital to be accumulated in a given period of time (Smith, 1998). Volume 3 explores 
how the valorization imperative is manifested in the drive to introduce innovations 
lowering the costs of raw materials, machinery, plants, and infrastructure. Volume 3 also 
sketches how technologies speeding and extending the scale of sales to consumers aid the 
valorization process, as do communication technologies speeding financial transactions and 
expanding the geographical range from which financial centers appropriate savings and to 
which they can transmit credit and investments.  
Throughout all three Volumes Marx remarks on the threat technological development in 
capitalism poses to the environment. In Marx’s discussion the fundamental problem stems 
from the discordant temporalities of capitalism and the environment of which human life is 
but a part. A productivity advance of, say, twenty percent, could be used to produce the 
same level of output in twenty percent less time. Or it could lead to the production of a 
twenty percent greater output in the same time. In capitalism the latter option necessarily 
tends to be selected, since competition among units of capital imposes the imperative to 
accumulate as much capital as possible as fast as possible, and this goal is generally 
advanced by producing and selling more commodities. Past a certain point this accelerated 
temporality will come into tension with the temporality of ecosystems: the capitalist 
economy tends to extract natural resources at a faster rate ecosystems can reproduce them, 
and engender wastes at a faster rate than ecosystems can absorb them. This state of affairs 
can continue for an extended period of time without serious difficulties arising, and 
technological fixes (such as the creation of substitutes for exhausted natural resources, the 
discovery of technical processes that use fewer natural resources, or generate less waste, or 
process wastes into non-harmful or even useable substances, and so on), can extend this 
period. Nonetheless, the underlying tension remains. For Marx, the probability that a society 
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whose main organizing principle is “Grow or die!” (or, more exactly, “Ceaselessly augment 
value!”) will generate environmental crises approaches one (Harvey, 1996, Part Two).  
The dimension of technology and social change for which Marx is best known has to do 
with the labor process in the capitalist workplace. Marx thought that the pernicious effects 
of the valorization imperative for the satisfaction of human ends are most apparent in the 
capital/wage labor relation. Wage laborers are required to perform surplus labor beyond 
that producing an amount of value equivalent to their wages. Insofar as technologies in the 
workplace reduce the latter period of time, they extend the former: 
Like every other instrument for increasing the productivity of labour, machinery is 
intended to cheapen commodities and, by shortening the part of the working day in 
which the worker works for himself, to lengthen the other part, the part he gives to the 
capitalist for nothing. The machine is a means for producing surplus-value (Marx, 1976, 
492). 
Under these conditions the scientific-technological knowledge embodied in machinery is 
experienced by individual workers as an “alien force”:  
In no respect does the machine appear as the means of labour of the individual worker 
… (T)he machine, which possesses skill and power in contrast to the worker, is itself the 
virtuoso … Science, which compels the inanimate members of the machinery, by means 
of their design, to operate purposefully as an automaton, does not exist in the worker’s 
consciousness, but acts upon him through the machine as an alien force, as the force of 
the machine itself (Marx, 1987, 82-3). 
Collective organization can overcome an individual worker’s sense of powerlessness. But 
collective organization is difficult to maintain if the workforce is divided, and technological 
change can be used to foster such divisions: technologically-induced unemployment can set 
those desperate for work against those desperate to retain their jobs (Marx, 1976, Chapter 
25), while communication and transportation technologies make the threat of shifting 
investment from one group of workers to another more effective. Technologies that deskill 
those enjoying relatively high levels of remuneration and control over their labor process 
also shift the balance in power between capital and labor in favour of the former (Marx 1976, 
549). Technologies undercutting the effectiveness of strikes warrant mention as well: 
[M]achinery does not just act as a superior competitor to the worker, always on the 
point of making him superfluous. It is a power inimical to him … It is the most 
powerful weapon for suppressing strikes, those periodic revolts of the working class 
against the autocracy of capital … It would be possible to write a whole history of the 
inventions made since 1830 for the sole purpose of providing capital with weapons 
against working-class revolt (Marx, 1976, 562-3). 
It is important to stress that the social consequences of technological innovation are 
indeterminate in particular cases. Labor history shows that the very technologies introduced 
to divide the work-force, deskill certain categories of workers, or break strikes, may in other 
contexts contribute to worker unity, enhance the skills of different workers, and help labor 
struggles succeed. Nonetheless, ownership and control of capital grants its holders the 
“operational autonomy” to initiate and direct the innovation process in the workplace 
(Feenberg, 2010). As long as this power is in place, Marx thought, technological change will 
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tend to reinforce the structural coercion and exploitation at the heart of the capital/wage 
labor relation. 
A final point regarding the workplace to be mentioned here refers again to productivity 
advances associated with technological change. As we saw above, the “default setting” in 
capitalism is for this advance to be used to increase output without sufficient regard for 
long-term environmental impacts. This use of technologies is also correlated with an 
intensification (and often extension) of the workday, despite the fact that gains in 
productivity could in principle be used to reduce labor time with no loss of livelihood or 
living standards. Marx wrote, “Since all free time is time for free development, the capitalist 
usurps the free time created by workers for society” (Marx, 1987, 22). Marx thought that from 
a world historical perspective this was the ultimately the single greatest way in which 
technological change in capitalism hampers human flourishing. 
There is one final issue to be considered in this survey of Marx’s account of the social 
consequences following technological change in capitalism. Marx argued that the very 
investments in technological change intended to further capital accumulation tend to undercut 
the accumulation process. New plants and firms will enter a sector when investments in fixed 
capital embodying more advanced technologies promise to generate above average profits due 
to higher levels of efficiency or products of superior quality. But as they do so, established 
firms do not automatically withdraw at a rate that would maintain an equilibrium of supply 
and demand. While the very weakest will go under, others will be content to obtain an average 
(or perhaps even below average) rate of profit on their circulating capital (raw materials, labor 
costs, etc.). There are a variety of reasons why this is a rational course for them to take. These 
units of production have already made the fixed capital investments (machinery, buildings, 
and so on) that allow profits to be won from circulating capital; if they walk away these 
investments will be wasted. Further, the management and work force of these firms have 
sector-specific skills that likely would be difficult to duplicate in any reasonable time period 
were the firms to shift operations to a different sector. They will also have established 
relationships with suppliers and distributors operating in the given sector that would be 
difficult and costly to establish elsewhere. They may also have relations with local 
governments and universities that provide important support (infrastructure, research, etc.), 
support they might not enjoy if they were to shift operations to a different sector. There is, 
finally, the hope that if they hold on they may be able at some later time to make investments 
in advanced technologies and leap-frog over their competitors. While these actions are rational 
from the standpoint of individual units of capital, they can have a collectively irrational result: 
the rate of profit in the sector as a whole tends to decline as the lower profits of older firms in 
the sector outweigh the above average profits appropriated by a relatively few newcomers 
(Reuten, 1991). When this dynamic occurs simultaneously in a number of key sectors, Marxists 
speak of an overaccumulation crisis. One of the most important theses of the Marxian theory of 
technological change is that the technological dynamism of capitalism necessarily tends to 
generate such crises. 
The contrast between the Marxian perspective on the social consequences of technological 
change in capitalism and the classical liberal and liberal egalitarian viewpoints is complex. 
Marx actually agrees that the technological dynamism of capitalism furthers the prevision of 
the material preconditions for human flourishing more than any previous form of social 
organization. But he did not agree that technological change in an institutional context of so-
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called free markets and “minimal” states allows individuals the greatest opportunities of 
living lives of their own choosing, as classical liberals hold. Nor did he accept the liberal 
egalitarian assertion that all individuals could stand as an equal in social life if only the 
proper political regulations were in place. 
No attempt will be made here to definitively resolve the controversy among these three 
competing perspectives. In the concluding section I shall attempt to show the continuing 
relevance of the Marxian account of technological change by presenting a brief historical 
narrative of major developments in the global economy in recent decades. My goal is to 
suggest that the Marxian framework illuminates important dimensions of the present 
historical moment overlooked in competing accounts. 
5. Technology and social change in recent decades 
Global politics today is dominated by the crisis of state finances. The public debt of many 
countries has reached 60% or more of their gross domestic product, and is estimated by some 
to soar to as much as five times GDP within a generation. In the United States and elsewhere 
commentators in the classical liberal tradition proclaim that their view of the predatory and 
profligate nature of more-than-minimal states is fully confirmed. Invoking moral obligations to 
future generations, they call for deep cuts in state programs, while resisting calls to raise taxes 
on the wealthy whose investments “create jobs and economic growth.”  
Writers sympathetic to liberal egalitarian values tell a different story. State deficits have 
metastasized primarily because of the $20 trillion of bailouts and stimulus provided by 
governments to the private sector in the wake of the “Great Recession” that began in 2008. 
The U.S. government in particular has allowed banks to exchange practically unlimited 
amounts of toxic assets for good money. This state spending saved the global economy from 
catastrophic collapse; banks have been recapitalized, and non-financial corporations have 
returned to profitability. But unemployment remains high, housing prices continue to 
decline, and the global economy remains extremely fragile. To reduce state deficits now 
would be to repeat the mistakes of the U.S. in the 1930’s and Japan in the 90s, when weak 
economies were pushed back into recession by premature budget cuts. In the short term, 
state spending must increase to create jobs. If public investments are made in infrastructure, 
education, and new (especially “green”) technologies, this will spur economic growth, 
making a reduction of state deficits in the future far less onerous than it would be today. 
Liberal egalitarian analysts insist that inadequate financial regulation, the root cause of the 
crisis, be addressed as well. Seduced by the “efficient market hypothesis,” regulators 
allowed paroxysms of “irrational exuberance” to generate one speculative bubble after 
another. The government bailouts following the bursting of these bubbles encouraged even 
more reckless behavior until, inevitably, the scale of the bailout overwhelmed state finances. 
Insufficient financial regulation also allowed debt levels in numerous regions of the global 
economy to exceed rational bounds, resulting in a growing and unsustainable imbalance 
between debtor and creditor regions. Funds lent to the former fueled consumption of 
imports and speculation in real estate or financial markets, neither of which generated the 
monetary returns necessary to repay the loans. A rebalancing of the global economy must 
now take place. Surplus regions must expand their domestic economies to compensate for 
the retrenchment of overly indebted consumers elsewhere and to help deficit regions reduce 
their debts through increased exports. In the worst cases (such as Greece) foreign lenders 
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must write off many of their foolish loans (their failure to do this has brought the Eurozone 
project into question). Most importantly, lending and borrowing institutions throughout the 
globe must be regulated to ensure that such imbalances never again arise. 
In the view defended here, the roots of the 2008 financial crisis can be found in the global 
slowdown of the 1970s after a quarter century of exceptionally high rates of investment, growth, 
and profits. The causes of this slowdown were varied and complex. However, one essential 
element was undoubtedly the technological dynamism of Japanese and European (predominately German) 
producers. In 1945 the Japanese economy was roughly a century behind the U.S., while Germany 
lagged a half century or so. By the 70s both had more than caught up. In many of the most 
technologically sophisticated sectors of the world market (consumer electronics, autos, 
motorcycles, chemicals, business machines, steel, and so on), these firms produced higher 
quality products much more efficiently than their U.S. competitors. U.S. producers in these 
sectors did not shut down as Japanese and German companies added to productive capacity in 
the global economy, and over time the rate of growth of productive capacity increased faster 
than the rate of growth of markets to absorb it. The result of this technological development was 
an overaccumulation of capital, manifested in excess productive capacity in all the leading 
sectors of the world market. This overaccumulation soon led to lower rates of investment, 
profits, and economic growth in the world market as a whole (Brenner 2006). 
Economic crises are capitalism’s way of renewing itself by destroying excess productive 
capacity through bankruptcies. The recessions of the 1970s and early 80s were certainly 
destructive. But there was no “Great Recession” devaluing capital investments on a scale 
commensurate with the problem. A number of measures allowed the global system to go 
down a different path, often referred to as “neoliberalism.” Some of these measures 
essentially involved technological developments. Some did not. But they must all be 
considered social consequences of technological change in the sense that they were all 
responses to the overaccumulation difficulties brought about by technological development 
in the post WWII global economy. 
1. Following Nixon’s unilateral decision in 1971 to in effect replace gold as the ultimate 
form of world money with the dollar, there was a historically unprecedented increase in 
liquidity (credit money) in the global economy in general, and the United States in 
particular. In principle this made it possible for markets to expand and absorb 
productive capacity that could not otherwise be absorbed. 
2. If increased liquidity simply set off inflation, that would not have offered the capitalist 
world economy a promising way forward. Accordingly, labor was disciplined through 
the “Volcker Shock”of 1978, a sudden rise in interest rates designed to raise the rate of 
unemployment in the “core” regions of the world economy beyond what had been 
politically acceptable previously. The pressure on real wages that followed kept 
inflation contained and set the stage for a significant increase in the rate of exploitation. 
The technological changes associated with the rise of “lean production” (or “flexible 
production”) were a major part of this story (Smith, 2000). Improvements in 
productivity due to the introduction of information technologies into manufacturing 
led to waves of layoffs in the most organized sectors of the workforce. Information 
technologies also furthered corporate “downsizing,” allowing parts of production 
chains to be outsourced without sacrificing management control of the production 
process as a whole. The advance of transportation technologies played a major role as 
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well in the emergence of a “networked economy” of decentralized production chains. 
These technological changes had a profound social consequence: the balance of power 
between capital and labor fundamentally shifted to the favor of the former. The 
increased effectiveness of the threat of unemployment from downsizing allowed capital 
to impose real wage cuts (despite increasing productivity), speed-ups, lengthened work 
days, tiered wages, and the spread of precarious employment (part time and temporary 
work), all of which contributed to the increase in the rate of exploitation (Basso, 2003; 
Head, 2003).7 In neoliberal workplaces, no less than the factories of Marx’s day, 
technology remained “a means for producing surplus-value.”8 Despite the 
contemporary rhetoric of worker “empowerment,” workers’ role in determining the 
design and use of machinery in the labor process continued to be radically restricted. 
The process of objectifying workers’ skills in machinery accelerated with information 
technologies, as did the use of these technologies to continue operations during strikes. 
The electronic monitoring of the workforce on a massive scale is another feature of the 
neoliberal workplace corroborating the continued relevance of Marx’s account of 
technological change in the capitalist workplace (Darlin, 2009). 
3. The information technologies and transportation technologies that made increased 
subcontracting possible also enabled production chains to extend across borders 
through foreign direct investment and subcontracting to locally-owned producers. The 
majority of foreign direct investment continued to flow from one wealthy region of the 
world economy to another. But Japanese foreign direct investment in China and other 
developing economies in East Asia exploded; more and more U.S. plants were build in 
Mexico, China, and elsewhere; and after the implosion of the Soviet model German 
capitals shifted considerable funds to investment in facilities in Eastern Europe. A 
relatively small portion of this production was intended for the local domestic market; 
most was exported back to the “core” regions of the world economy. This 
“globalization” of trade and investment contributed to the increase in the rate of 
exploitation though the increased ability of corporations to play one sector of the global 
labor force against another, further shifting the balance of power between labor and 
capital in the latter’s favor (Huws, 2007; Smith, 2009). Inexpensive imports from low 
waged regions of the global economy offered workers in the “core” regions some 
compensation for the decline/stagnation of their real wages.  
4. Increased liquidity in the world market (#1) resulted in the accumulation of vast reserve 
of “Eurodollars” outside the U.S. and other forms of “stateless” money, as well as 
increased cross-border flows of financial investment. The globalization of trade and 
investment (#3) required companies and governments to exchange currencies on a 
much greater scale, while Nixon’s abandoning of the gold standard led to a tripling of 
volatility in currency exchange markets. New financial products designed to limit the 
risks associated with currency fluctuations were developed. Financial firms rapidly 
expanded, profiting from ever-more exotic forms of financial assets. Over these decades 
the financial sector undertook the largest private-sector investment in information 
                                                                 
7 The anti-union policies of leading states played a key role as well. 
8 In the U.S., for example, after 1979, “The value of labor power fell for the remainder of the century (as 
productivity grew but hourly real wage rates for production workers did not), so that the rate of 
surplus value (the ratio of money surplus value to the wages of productive labor) increased by about 
40%” (Mohun, 2009, 1028). 
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technologies, hired the greatest concentration of advanced knowledge workers, and 
achieved the fastest rate of product innovation in the global economy with the aid of the 
massive computing power they had purchased. The “financialization” of the economy 
exacerbated economic inequality due to the highly concentrated ownership of financial 
assets, further shifting the balance of power introduced in #2. The main point to insist 
upon is that in a world of persisting overaccumulation difficulties in non-financial 
sectors, financial speculation is “rational” from the standpoint of capital, and therefore 
must be considered as another social consequence of the technological developments 
that generated persisting overaccumulation difficulties. 
5. The final measure defining neoliberalism is the role of consumption as an “engine” of 
global growth, reflected in the increasing imbalance between “deficit” regions of the 
world economy and “surplus regions.” In the United States, wealthy households were 
able to go on a binge of hyperconsumerism due to the income gains they enjoyed as a 
result of the increase in the rate of exploitation (#2) and their gains from financial 
speculation (#4). Less affluent households were able to expand consumption levels 
despite the stagnation of real wages due to an unprecedented increase in household 
debt (#1) and in the appreciation of the value of their homes in the Great Housing 
Bubble (#4). An increasing proportion of this consumption took the form of imports, 
allowing exporting nations (Germany and China especially) to expand and enjoy 
greater trade surpluses, while the trade deficits of the U.S. and other nations (Greece, 
most notably) began their remorseless expansion. Banks in regions enjoying trade 
surpluses had a strong incentive to continue extending credit to agents in deficit 
countries, since that allowed domestic exporters with which they were tied to continue 
exporting to deficit regions. These loans also limited the appreciation of the currencies 
of exporting nations, which would have made their exports more expensive. With the 
dollar serving as world money (necessary for the purchase of oil and weapons, as well 
as a relatively secure store of value in an increasingly turbulent global economy) foreign 
investors and governments were happy to hold massive amounts of their reserves in 
U.S. Treasury bills (a form of credit receiving much lower returns than U.S. investors 
appropriated from their foreign investments). Speculative bubbles in the U.S., Ireland, 
Iceland, and elsewhere were fueled by foreign borrowings. The imbalances between 
deficit/debtor regions of the world market and surplus/credit regions increased over 
time to unsustainable levels, as many commentators have pointed out. But the problem 
goes deeper than the usual explanations, which place the primary blame either on 
irresponsible borrowers or on an international financial architecture that does not 
provide adequate supervision of cross-border financial flows. These global imbalances 
were a “rational” response to the need for an engine of growth in a world economy in 
which technological developments generated persisting overaccumulation difficulties. 
From the standpoint of capital, these measures were a success. They allowed profit levels to 
be (partially) restored in the global economy after the slowdown of the 1970s. Levels of 
investment and growth in the global economy were sufficient to avoid a “Great Recession,” 
at least in the “core” of global economy. The value of financial assets in general, and the U.S. 
stock market in particular, trended steeply upwards for an unprecedented period of time. 
The information technology revolution continued to spawn dynamic new firms and 
industries. The explosion of trade and foreign direct investment facilitated rates of growth in 
East and South Asia that were also absolutely unprecedented.  
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We are now, however, at a different moment in world history. The U.S. consumer market 
can no longer serve as the engine of growth for the global economy. With real wages 
stagnant, expansion of this consumer market required a constant expansion of household 
debt, a process that was always bound to reach a limit point. The same was true of other 
regions whose expanding debts provided exporting countries with growing markets. 
Financialization also appears to have reached a limit point. As more and more of the profits 
in the global economy were appropriated by the financial sector, more and more of the credit 
money created there remained there (household debt, great as it was, was dwarfed by debt 
levels in the financial sector), and more and more of the profits of non-financial firms flowed 
into the financial sector (for stock buy-backers, mergers, etc.). This led to self-sustaining 
speculative bubbles occurring with increasing frequency and increasing scale over the course 
of the neoliberal period. They all eventually burst. When they did, the specter of the 
repressed Great Recession haunted the financial pages. But each time Central Banks came to 
the rescue, pumping liquidity into the financial sector and setting the stage for another round 
of speculative excess. The massive liquidity provided by Central Banks, and the ever-growing 
reserves held by surplus countries, pushed global interest rates to historical lows. Investors 
were happy to borrow immense sums at these rates and invest them in capital assets 
promising higher returns. The financial sector was happy to use its immense computing 
power to create ever more exotic financial products for these investors, most (in)famously by 
slicing and dicing “subprime” (risky) mortgages into exotic and all but incomprehensible 
securities (“collateralized debt obligations cubed,” anyone?). Rating agencies assured 
investors that there was relatively little risk from purchasing these products, using computer 
models that assumed that the future would be like the past, despite the fact that in the past 
there was neither (almost) unlimited cheap credit nor financial instruments of such 
computer-generated incomprehensibility. The social consequences of these (mis) uses of 
technology were all too predictable. When a relative handful of subprime mortgages went 
bad, the immense edifice of global finance collapsed, revealing the fraud and collective 
delusion upon which it had been based. No one knew exactly which financial institutions 
were insolvent from their toxic loans and toxic securities; soon enough it was reasonable to 
think almost all were. Firms that had offered insurance against bad loans and losses in the 
value of securities (using the same flawed computer models) did not have anything close to 
the funds required to meet their obligations. The housing market collapsed, eroding the 
wealth of deeply indebted households to the point where additional credit was all but 
impossible to obtain. The specter of the long-deferred Great Recession arose once again. And 
once again Central Banks rode to the rescue. This time, however, the scale of the bubble was 
such that the scale of the bailouts threatens the solvency of those governments forced to 
undertake them. Here too a limit point seems to have been reached. 
6. Conclusion 
The classical liberal view fails to grasp the magnitude of the market failures that have 
occurred in recent decades. From a Marxian standpoint the standard liberal egalitarian 
position is flawed as well. Immense indebtedness, global imbalances, and recurrent financial 
bubbles are not accidental and irrational occurrences that could have been avoided if only 
regulators had fulfilled their responsibilities. Together with an increased rate of exploitation 
these measures were a rational (from the standpoint of capitalist rationality, at least) 
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response to the global slowdown of the 1970s, the legacy of the technological dynamism of 
the post WWII “golden age.” They could have been avoided only at the cost of turning the 
sharp but relatively brief recessions of the 1970’s and early 80’s into a massive destruction of 
excess productive capacity in the global economy. 
The question now is where we go from here. If the consumer and government spending of 
overly-indebted economies has reached a limit point, what can take its place? 
Non-financial firms sit on trillions of dollars of cash. Writers in the classical liberal tradition 
in the United States and elsewhere believe that radical cuts to state deficits and the 
eradication of “burdensome” state regulations will automatically lead to an investment 
binge, setting off a new period of dynamic growth in the global economy. This is pure 
fantasy. Overaccumulation problems have not dissipated in the global economy. In fact, 
new productive capacity added to the world economy in China and other developing 
countries has exacerbated these difficulties. Key sectors of the “networked economy” 
(computers, communication equipment, semi-conductors, and so on) have proven to be as 
susceptible to overcapacity as core sectors of the old industrial economy ever were. This 
explains why the rate of investment in the world market has a whole has trended 
downward since the 1970s, despite the recovery of profits and despite the amazing growth 
of investment in China and other developing countries; that growth has failed to 
compensate for declining or stagnating rates elsewhere (Brenner, 2006). 
What of the liberal egalitarian hope that the right mix of additional government regulation 
and additional government stimulus could give birth to entirely new industries, dedicated 
to the development and use of “green” technologies? Could this provide an outlet for 
private investment, spurring a new “golden age” of capitalist development? There are good 
reasons to fear that this too is wishful thinking. This brings us to what I take to be an 
absolutely central issue regarding technology and social change in the contemporary global 
economy, the paradoxical social consequences of the spread of national innovation systems 
across the globe (Nelson, 1993; Smith, 2007). 
Today four countries spend over three percent of their Gross Domestic Product on research 
and development, and another six devote over two percent of GDP of their annual economic 
output on R&D (The Economist, 2011). These nations in addition provide extensive public 
and private funding for scientific-technical training, public expenditures providing markets 
for innovations, and public policies to encourage private sector investment in advanced 
technologies (such as accelerated depreciation of the fixed capital that embodies 
technological change, a major tax break). They also possess financial sectors capable of 
allocating credit rapidly to start-ups operating at the technological frontier. As a result of 
this unparalleled proliferation of national innovation systems the moment a cluster of 
innovations with significant commercial potential emerges anywhere in the global economy 
a plethora of extensive research expenditures, tax breaks, other direct and indirect subsidies, 
and allocations of credit, are mobilized in a number of regions more or less simultaneously. 
In use-value terms this is a recipe for continued technological dynamism. In value terms, 
however, things are more complicated. The more national innovation systems are in place, 
the sooner innovating industries and sectors in the world market are threatened with 
overcapacity problems. This compresses the period in which high profits can be won from a 
competitive technological advantage. The period in which the commercialization of new 
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innovations spurs a high rate of investment is compressed as well. In brief, a world in which 
effective national innovation systems have proliferated is a world of persisting 
overaccumulation difficulties. As long as this is the case, technological dynamism in the 
future (whether of “green technologies or any other sort) is not likely to lead to a new 
“golden age” of high rates of investment, economic growth, and real wages gains over an 
extended period.9 
In this context the hope that surplus regions will expand their domestic economies to allow 
deficit nations to export their way out of debt is naïve. Given the facts that the ever-
increasing debt card has been played, government stimulus programs cannot increase 
without limit, leading sectors of the world market remain plagued by serious overcapacity, 
and no new investment boom is likely to be inaugurated, the odds are extremely good that a 
considerable portion of excess productive capacity in the global economy is going to be 
destroyed in coming years. Political and economic elites in Germany and China, the two 
leading surplus/creditor nations, know that increasing the share of the world market 
possessed by capitals operating in their territories will lessen the odds that these capitals 
will be the ones devalued. Increases in domestic real wages of sufficient magnitude to 
compensate for the lost purchasing power in overly indebted regions would threaten this 
goal. Such increases would raise the prices of exports, and heighten the risk of capital fleeing 
Germany and China for Eastern Europe and even lower-waged areas in East Asia. Looking 
at the matter from another perspective, Germany and, increasingly, China have their own 
serious overaccumulation problems. No remotely feasible expansion of their domestic 
economies would be able to absorb their productive capacity; their continued growth 
demands the conquering of export markets (more accurately, this is a demand of capitalist 
rationality in the circumstances these countries find themselves in). Germany and China 
have reached the position they have in the world market—with Germany the unquestioned 
power of Europe and the Chinese economy now projected to surpass the size of the U.S.’s 
far sooner than anyone thought possible not long ago—due in good measure to their success 
in appropriating surpluses. Political and economic elites in these countries no doubt look at 
the U.S. and Greece and see the fate of regions that further the good of the capitalist world 
market by expanding domestic consumption to absorb excess productive capacity in the 
global economy: sooner or later they are presented a bill they cannot pay. From the 
standpoint of capitalist rationality, what would be rational about going down that path? 
                                                                 
9 Innovative products and processes can still be correlated with high profits for an extended period of time 
despite the proliferation of national innovation systems if intellectual property rights are extended in scope 
and enforcement. There are, however, serious social costs from doing this. It threatens to hamper 
innovation in society as a whole. Firms will increasingly avoid promising lines of research that might 
possibly infringe patents. Funds that would have otherwise gone into research will be shifted to support 
the armies of patent lawyers necessary to defend IPR claims and attack those of others. Fewer small firms 
will engage in innovative activities, lacking the funds required by the legal system. The tendency to 
concentrate of economic power in large corporations will be reinforced, since they are better able to fund 
legal costs and in a better position to come to mutually beneficial cross-licensing agreements with each 
other. From the liberal egalitarian perspective of Benkler, the extension of the intellectual property rights 
regime has another truly tragic consequence: commons-based peer production, which has the potential to 
become the most positive social consequence of the information technology revolution, will not be allowed 
to develop that world historical potential. Commons-based peer production requires that information be 
treated as a free public good, while the extension of intellectual property rights intensifies a 
commodification of information preventing this (Smith, 2012).  
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In these circumstances, capital’s best bet for pursuing profits is a yet greater ratcheting up of 
the rate of exploitation10 and household debt, and a yet more desperate search for speculative 
bubbles from which easy money can be made before the “smart money” gets out. From this 
perspective the mainstream policy debate between adherents of classical liberalism and liberal 
egalitarians comes down to the question whether the austerity inflicted on ordinary citizens is 
to be immediate and brutal, or somewhat more gradual and somewhat less brutal. Either path 
leads to persisting mass unemployment, a worsening gap between productivity gains and real 
wages, a reduction if not elimination of pensions, extended work lives, cuts to health 
programs, cuts to education, and cuts to anti-poverty programs at the very time rates of 
poverty, homelessness, and hunger skyrocket (McNally 2010). 
In contemporary capitalism technological development and the productivity advances 
associated with it have brought about a social world in which there is greater material 
insecurity rather than less, a world where technical rationality is increasingly conjoined with 
social irrationality. Surely another world is possible.11 
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